The Australian Family, March 2004
MEN AND WOMEN APART
Bob Birrell
(The following article is taken from a new AFA publication, Men and Women Apart: Partnering in Australia, by Bob Birrell, Virginia Rapson and Clare Hourigan. It contains the book’s Executive Summary, and the conclusion.)
On the occasion of President George W. Bush’s visit to Australia, John Howard declared that ‘strong families are a nation’s greatest asset’. Yet, since he became Prime Minister in March 1996, the marriage rate amongst young adults in Australia has plummeted and the overall level of partnering has significantly declined. Only a decade or so ago, the great majority of young men and women aged 30-34 were married and thus likely to have established a secure relationship conducive to the raising of a family. This is no longer the case. In 1986, 72 per cent of women aged 30-34 and 65 per cent of men aged 30-34 were married. By 2001, the comparable figures were 55 per cent for women and just 47 per cent for men.
De facto partnering rates have increased but, even when these are added to the marriage rates, partnering levels amongst young adult Australians in 2001 are well below those evident in 1986. De facto relationships are not a substitute for married partnerships. Most young de facto partnerships become marriages if they survive. However, older men and women in de facto partnerships are heavily drawn from the ranks of low income men. A high proportion of de facto relationships also involve step children. For 40 per cent of men aged 35-39 in de facto partnerships where there are children present, the eldest child is their step child compared with five per cent in marriage partnerships.
The decline in partnering is not occurring within the social class assumed by most media commentators. Since 1986 most of the decline in partnering amongst women has occurred in the ranks of those without university degrees — that is, it is not amongst the professional women who are thought to have the greatest choice as to their lifestyle and/or marriage options. For example, in 1986, some 77 per cent of non-degree-qualified women in the 30-34 year age group were partnered, compared with 70 per cent of degree-qualified women. By 2001, 67 per cent of degree-qualified women in the 30-34 age group were partnered, compared with 66 per cent of all other women in this age group.
The findings for men were parallel to those for women. By 2001 there was a huge and growing gap in partnering rates for high income men relative to low income males, especially those not in the labour force or unemployed. For example, for men aged 30-34 earning less than $16,000, 41 per cent were partnered compared with 71 per cent for men earning $52,000 or more. The gulf is even greater regarding marriage. Men who are married are now predominantly drawn from the ranks of the better off. Again for men aged 30-34, thirty per cent of the low income group were in married partnerships compared with 59 per cent of those in the higher income group.
This is a surprising finding given the widespread perception that the better educated and more affluent have many more lifestyle options and are more influenced by post-modernist ideals of individual autonomy. This report argues a contrary thesis. It is that new forms of collaborative partnering (emphasising the sharing of domestic and work roles) are emerging which are providing an attractive basis for long-term partnering relationships for such persons. These arrangements appear to be highly adaptive to the current economic circumstances, where two incomes are becoming essential to the attainment of high amenity housing and consumption-rich life styles.
Consistent with these findings, divorce rates for degree-qualified men and women in their thirties have declined. Again this result contradicts accepted wisdom. There is an increase in the overall rate of divorce in Australia, but it is amongst men and women who are less affluent or do not have a university degree.
What are the living arrangements of this increasing share of men and women who are unpartnered? Of the unpartnered men aged 30-34, one in four still lives at home with their parents. Only 28 per cent live as lone persons. The rest either live in group households or other settings. In the case of unpartnered women aged 30-34, 31 per cent are living in a family situation as a lone parent. For the majority of unpartnered women who have no post-school qualifications, 45 per cent were in this situation.
Notwithstanding these results, media reports highlight the problems of degree-qualified women who are looking for a committed partner. It is true that one third of degree-qualified women aged 30-34 are not partnered. It is also true that there are now many more single women with university education qualifications than single males with these qualifications. This ‘gap’ gives some credence to the notion of a ‘marriage gap’.
Men are the largely unnoticed and unacknowledged losers in this process. As noted, the unpartnered are heavily concentrated among the less affluent. These men, especially those aged in their thirties, face an even more serious marriage gap’. As indicated above, nearly half of single women aged in their late twenties and thirties who do not hold post-school qualifications are lone parents. Their family obligations and almost universal reliance on parenting payments limits their availability and interest in re-partnering.
Why have partnering rates fallen so sharply amongst less affluent men and women? Why is family instability so marked in families composed of such persons? One answer is that the policies of structural change which have driven the Australian economy have produced both winners and losers. Amongst the main losers are young men without post-school education. Full-time employment levels amongst men in their late twenties and thirties have fell sharply between 1986 and 1996, and continued to fall (though at a slower pace) between 1996 and 2001. By 2001, only 67 per cent of males aged 30-34 in Australia were employed full-time, compared with 78 per cent in 1986. Partnering rates amongst the third of men not employed full-time are very low. It is argued that the reluctance of these men to take on marriage and parenthood responsibilities (and perhaps of women to take them on as partners) reflects their financial circumstances as well as the concurrent increases in the cost of establishing a household.
The decline in fertility in Australia correlates with the fall in married partnering rates detailed in this report. There has been no decline since 1986 in the propensity of married women (as measured near the end of their child-bearing lives) to have a child. Almost all married women have had a child by the time they reach the ages of 35-39. In 2001, 87 per cent of wives aged 35-39 were living with a child aged 0-14 in the family. This compares to 86 per cent in 1986. What has changed is the proportion of women in married relationships during their late twenties and early thirties. This decline in partnering levels is a major contributor to the decline in fertility.
This position is at odds with explanations which focus exclusively on the growing cost of children, particularly as manifested in loss of earnings for women who have to leave the labour force in order to fulfil the early motherhood role. Though not denying the disincentives to having children for women who find it difficult to combine paid work and motherhood, this study argues more attention should be placed on why men and women are not partnering and thus are not in a situation to begin contemplating having children.
There has been some compensating rise in the number of children living in de facto families and lone parent families. In 2001, 63 per cent of women aged 35-39 who lived in a de facto relationship had a child aged 0-14 living in the family. In the case of lone parents, most still derive from marital breakdown. However, the proportion of births occurring amongst women who do not have a secure partnership at the time of the birth is increasing. While the boost to fertility levels may be welcome, the contribution of these mothers (along with the breakdown of established families) to the concurrent rise in the proportion of Australia’s children being raised in lone parent households is a major social issue in Australia.
The divide between winners and losers on the economic front in Australia is being mirrored amongst families. Marriage partnerships are being concentrated amongst the winners; and broken marriages, lone parent families and single persons amongst the economic losers.
This division is affecting Australia’s children. The majority are being brought up in stable and economically comfortable circumstances. However, there is a growing minority, now more than one in five of all children aged less than 15 years, who are experiencing the double disadvantage of living in a family with low financial resources and having only one parent responsible for their day-to-day care.
There are emerging spatial implications of these outcomes. A preliminary analysis of regional Australia indicates that the decline in partnering and increase in marital instability amongst less affluent families has been marked in Australia’s regional areas. It is argued that this is linked to the relatively poor economic circumstances of many of these regional areas. One consequence is that the proportion of families headed by a lone parent in much of regional Australia has reached at least one in every four families with children aged 0-14, compared with one in five families in Melbourne and Sydney.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
The main objective of this study has been to put on the table the factual situation about partnering levels in Australia. Most of those involved in studying and commenting on family and fertility issues in Australia are aware that partnering rates are declining. Most other people probably also sense that all is not well. However, it is doubtful whether the scale of the decline, or its implications, are understood. This is partly because it can only be fully appreciated if comparable statistics for earlier periods are set out. While one might imagine this to be a simple matter, it is not. Census data provide the most reliable source of information but subtle changes in definitions over successive censuses can easily mislead. In addition, careful specification is required if errors are to be avoided. Moreover, it is expensive to procure the necessary data.
In addition, some analysts are reluctant to delve deeply into the partnering issue. To do so may imply criticism towards those not partnered or towards those who have broken from a partnership. This stance inhibits probing into, or calling attention to, the striking decline in partnering which has been identified in this study. The rising proportion of single men and women in their late twenties and thirties is of profound significance for many of the social issues which bedevil contemporary Australian society. Though not addressed in this study they include problems of social isolation and ill health.
The key finding is that most of this decline in partnering over the 1986-2001 period has occurred amongst men and women without post-school education. This outcome is not consistent with the dominant view in the academic literature that women with degrees are the most likely to experiment with new forms of relationships. The view has been that such women are the most exposed to competitive and individualistic values. They also have the highest investment in education which allows them the financial freedom to avoid traditional marital relationships should they choose to do so. Nor does it accord with the popular literature. In this literature there is a heavy focus on the situation of degree-qualified women and their apparent difficulties in finding ‘suitable’ partners. This is partly because these women write most of the commentary on the issue.
There is some basis for these concerns in that there is evidence of a ‘marriage gap’ for degree-qualified women. However, the reality is that partnering rates for degree-qualified men and women are stabilising and the divorce rates within their ranks are declining. These outcomes are being built on a secure platform with the emergence of collaborative partnering ideals. This analysis suggests that family settings involving partners who both contribute in the paid work sphere and the domestic sphere are highly adaptive to contemporary circumstances.
The situation is not so promising for other men and women. Partnering, and in particular marriage rates, are in steep decline, especially for women without post-school education and for men on low or insecure incomes. There is little doubt that most of the thirty to forty per cent of men and women in their thirties who do not have post-school education and who are single are not in this situation by preference. Why is this so? It is unlikely to be any attachment to new values emphasising autonomy or freedom to pursue one’s own destiny. The more likely explanation is that the women in question have more financial independence than in the past. They are reluctant to take on a prospective male partner who cannot bring much in the way of financial resources to the relationship. For their part, notwithstanding the economic buoyancy of recent years, a significant (and increasing) minority of men are employed part-time, unemployed or not in the labour force. For this reason they do not have much going for them as regards attracting a partner and in any case are probably reluctant to take on the responsibilities associated with establishing a family. The increasing costs of housing add to this predicament.
The decline in partnering is linked to the growing proportion of families with young children headed by lone parents. In 2001, twenty-one per cent of families with children aged 0-14 were headed by a lone parent. The study shows that an increased share of these families derives from the ranks of women in their twenties who have never married and did not have a secure relationship at the time of the birth. This predicament adds to the difficulties of bringing up children in a lone parent household. The conclusion is that family life in Australia is becoming increasingly bifurcated. On the one hand, the majority of families consist of married couples who are relatively well resourced to invest in their children. On the other hand, an increasing minority consists of lone parent families with limited resources and without the presence of two parents to contribute to the raising of the children. There is also a growing minority in between consisting of de facto couples with children. They are distinct from married couples in that their family income is lower and nearly half of these families involve step children.
These social processes were shown to be particularly evident in regional areas which are amongst the most severe casualties of structural changes in Australia’s economy.
The decline in partnering has contributed to the fall in Australia’s total fertility rate to well below replacement rate. Almost all women in married couples (aside from those with infertility problems) have children by the time they reach their late thirties. Thus any decline in married partnering rates will be associated with lower birth rates. In Australia, most of the decline in marriage rates has occurred amongst women without post-school qualifications. When these women do get married, they have more children than their degree-qualified counterparts. This is why the decline in partnering amongst the majority of women who do not have degrees is such a serious issue for any prospect of raising fertility in Australia.